Dear reader,
My name is Joha-Maine Andrianatos, Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), Chartered Business Accountant in Practice (CIBA), and General Tax Practitioner (SAIT). I have spent close to two decades pulling apart payroll fraud, fake invoices, shell company schemes, procurement kickbacks, and financial statement manipulation across South African businesses.
This week’s headlines are dominated by the mistrial in the Lindsay Clancy case in Plymouth County, Massachusetts. After six days of deliberation, the jury’s foreperson sent the judge a note saying a single juror would not follow the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt. The following day, with no unanimous verdict reached, the court declared a mistrial.
Social media has split hard down the middle on this one, and a lot of the commentary stopped being about the law days ago. It has become about how people feel about a mother and a system that could not deliver a verdict. I understand the impulse. But I am not going to comment on the facts of that case, and I would caution against anyone doing so from a place of pure emotion rather than the record.
What the case is a useful reminder of is something we deal with on every single engagement. A finding of guilt is never “something bad happened, and this person caused it.” It is proof, element by element, beyond a reasonable doubt. Miss one element, and the charge does not stand, however terrible the outcome. Emotion is not evidence, and it is not a substitute for the elements the law actually requires us to test.
That is worth spelling out properly, because it is the single most useful discipline a fraud examiner can carry into a file. Three frameworks, side by side.
Common law fraud: R v Heyne
The leading authority, R v Heyne and Others 1956 (3) SA 604 (A), gives us the test every fraud examiner should be able to recite:
“Fraud is the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.”
Four elements, each with its own bar to clear:
- Misrepresentation: a false representation of fact, by words, writing, conduct, or silence where there is a duty to speak.
- Prejudice: actual or potential. Heyne is explicit that the risk “need not be financial or proprietary,” and it need not fall on the person the lie was told to.
- Unlawfulness: the conduct must be legally wrongful, not merely sharp practice or ordinary commercial puffery.
- Intention (dolus): must attach to both the misrepresentation and the prejudice, not just the lie itself. A good-faith error is not fraud.
Three points examiners still collapse into one. Potential prejudice is enough: “likely to prejudice” means a real possibility, not a probability. The risk must not be remote or fanciful; a theoretical harm will not do. And the prejudice need not be financial, and need not fall on the person who heard the lie. Heyne is also the authority that attempted fraud is possible: where the misrepresentation has been made but has not yet come to the representee’s attention. The stock illustration is a letter lost in the post. False books that have not yet been inspected can fall into that same category. That is not a shortcut for an unfinished file.
Statutory corruption: PRECCA
Corruption under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA), Act 12 of 2004, is built on a different set of elements, and mixing them up with Heyne’s is one of the more common errors:
- Actus reus: Give, accept, offer, or agree to give or accept. The offer alone can complete the act.
- Gratification: A benefit of value: money, a trip, a job, an advantage, or the avoidance of a loss. It need not actually change hands.
- Mens rea: Intent that the gratification influence the recipient to act in a certain way. This is not limited to a government official; the general offence applies to any person. Public officials, foreign officials, and agents get their own, separate sections.
- Unlawfulness: The induced conduct must be illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased.
Notice what corruption does not require that fraud does: there is no misrepresentation element, and no requirement of prejudice to a victim. Corruption is about improperly influencing conduct through a benefit; fraud is about deception causing risk of harm.
SARS matters get their own framework, and it is not the same as either of the above. Section 234 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011, splits into two tiers, both capped at two years: section 234(1) covers wilful conduct only (false certificates, false documents, obstructing a SARS official, dissipating assets), while section 234(2) covers a wider list of conduct such as failing to register, submit returns, retain records, or furnish information is committed either wilfully or negligently. Section 235, headed “Evasion of tax and obtaining undue refunds by fraud or theft,” is the serious offence, capped at five years, and it has its own elements:
- The conduct: One of a specific list: making, or causing to be made, a false statement or entry in a return or other document; signing such a document without reasonable grounds to believe it true; giving a false answer to a SARS information request; preparing, maintaining, or falsifying books of account or records; making use of fraud or contrivance; or making a false statement to obtain a refund or exemption.
- Intent to evade: The person must act with intent to evade tax, to assist someone else to evade it, or to obtain an undue refund under a tax Act. Negligence, which is enough under section 234(2), is not enough here.
Unlike Heyne, section 235 does not require proof that SARS has already suffered a loss, or even a potential one. The listed act plus the specified intent is what the section requires; whether SARS ever actually paid out or lost anything is not part of the test. That makes section 235 the strictest of the three frameworks on intent, and the most lenient on outcome, which is precisely the kind of distinction that gets lost when examiners default to “there’s clearly fraud here” language across the board.
How this changes what goes in a report
The ACFE’s Code of Professional Standards is unambiguous that our reports must be factual, based on reliable evidence, and must ” avoid opinions on the legal guilt or innocence of individuals.” We do not write ” X committed fraud as defined in R v Heyne,” or ” X’s conduct meets the PRECCA test,” or ” X evaded tax under section 235.” That is the conclusion the standard tells us not to draw.
We write the element map instead. For a fraud allegation:
- Misrepresentation: supported / not supported / equivocal
- Actual or potential prejudice: supported / not supported / equivocal
- Unlawfulness: supported / not supported / equivocal
- Intention, covering both the representation and the prejudice: supported / not supported / equivocal
For a corruption allegation:
- Actus reus (the act, offer, or agreement): supported / not supported / equivocal
- Gratification (a benefit of value, whether or not it moved): supported / not supported / equivocal
- Mens rea (intent to influence): supported / not supported / equivocal
- Unlawfulness of the induced conduct: supported / not supported / equivocal
For a tax evasion allegation under section 235:
- The listed conduct (false statement, false answer, false books, fraud or contrivance, or a false refund/exemption claim): supported / not supported / equivocal
- Intent to evade, to assist evasion, or to obtain an undue refund: supported / not supported / equivocal
Heyne, PRECCA, and section 235 are the authorities for their respective tests. The file is only the evidence against each limb of them. Where the evidence is silent or genuinely equivocal on an element, the report says so, plainly, rather than papering over the gap with the size of the loss or the severity of the allegation.
Stay vigilant,
Joha-Maine Andrianatos
Originally published in my Fraud Talk newsletter on LinkedIn.
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