When the Numbers Person Is the Fraud

Dear reader,

My name is Joha-Maine Andrianatos, Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), Chartered Business Accountant in Practice (CIBA), and General Tax Practitioner (SAIT). I have spent close to two decades pulling apart payroll fraud, fake invoices, shell company schemes, procurement kickbacks, and financial statement manipulation across South African businesses.

Two stories crossed my desk within days of each other. One is about an accountant, the other about a tax practitioner. Both involve the person a business trusts to keep its numbers honest. Then I looked at my own desk and realised I was working on a third.

When I walk into a business after a fraud, the owner almost always says, “But they were our accountant. They knew everything.” That’s exactly the problem. The person who knows everything about your money also knows where nobody is looking.

Case one: the accountant who built her own back door

Cassandra Labuschagne, an accountant at a Cape Town travel company, stole more than R17.3 million from her employer over five years. According to police, she created a fake platform on the company’s banking system. That gave her access to its accounts, and she channelled the money into a company she had registered herself, through 19 bank accounts.

Forensic audits uncovered the scheme. She was arrested in September 2025, and bail was successfully opposed. She entered into a plea and sentence agreement, was convicted on 134 counts of theft and money laundering, and was sentenced to 15 years’ direct imprisonment.

Case two: the nil return that wasn’t

The Hawks arrested Francis Muleso, a 45-year-old tax practitioner, over an alleged scheme from March 2016 to March 2020. Acting for a close corporation, he allegedly filed nil income tax returns even though the business was earning taxable income. After SARS referred the matter, investigators compared the CC’s bank records with its VAT submissions. They allege output tax was understated by more than R2.7 million and input tax overstated by more than R6.1 million. That puts the total prejudice to SARS at more than R9.6 million.

He was arrested at the KuGompo City Magistrates’ Court, where he was already facing similar charges in a separate matter. He was granted R50,000 bail, the case is postponed to 18 January 2027, and the Hawks say more arrests are imminent. These are still allegations, and he is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Case three: the VAT that moved between clients

This one is from my own files, so I’ll keep the details anonymous. A client came to us after changing accountants. When we rebuilt their VAT from the bank statements, the returns didn’t match the money. In some periods output VAT was understated. In others input VAT was overstated. It wasn’t one error or one bad month. It was a pattern.

As we dug deeper, we found sufficient evidence and reason to suspect that the previous accountant had been shifting VAT between his own clients. When a client was due a refund, he wouldn’t claim it, because large refunds attract SARS audits. Instead he moved the VAT to another client, using invoices issued across his client base to keep each client’s liability low. Where a refund couldn’t be avoided, he split it across periods or entities to stay under the audit radar.

On paper, nobody stood out. In reality, none of the returns reflected what the businesses actually owed or were owed. The client didn’t know. But the liability is the client’s. We are now helping the client regularise their affairs through SARS’s Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP), before SARS comes knocking.

The common thread

In all three cases, the bank statement told the truth while the books and the returns told a story. And in case two and in my own case, the tool was exactly the same: understate the output, overstate the input. All three came apart when someone independent compared the money that actually moved with what had been recorded or declared.

Why this matters to fraud examiners

  1. Access to the system is access to the money. Review banking profiles, beneficiaries and eFiling access regularly, and have someone other than the daily user do it.
  2. A nil return from a trading business is a red flag. If money moves through the bank account, there’s activity to declare.
  3. VAT fraud cuts both ways. Understated output tax hides sales, and overstated input tax invents expenses. Look at both sides of the VAT201, period by period.
  4. Rebuild from the bank, not the ledger. When the person who kept the books is the suspect, the books are the last thing you should rely on.
  5. Look for patterns, not mistakes. One wrong return is an error. The same direction of error, period after period, is a design.
  6. One client is rarely the only client. When a gatekeeper is compromised, assume every other entity they touched is exposed.
  7. Check who owns your suppliers. Run CIPC director searches against your staff list. A company registered by your own employee is a classic shell.
  8. Act before SARS does. If you inherit a mess, the VDP can give relief from understatement penalties and criminal prosecution, but only if the disclosure is voluntary and complete. Once SARS has started an audit or investigation on that issue, the door may already be closed.
  9. A business that never claims a refund can be a red flag. If the business model should produce refunds (exports, capital spend, a start-up phase) and none ever appear, ask why.
  10. Invoices between unrelated clients of the same accountant need explaining. When businesses that share nothing but an accountant start invoicing each other, test whether real goods or services changed hands.

Your accountant keeps the books, but the bank keeps the truth.

Sources: EWN, 11 November 2026; IOL, 27 October 2026; case three from the author’s own practice, details anonymised.

Originally published in my Fraud Talk newsletter on LinkedIn.

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